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Im  my  paper  "Thesen  zum  Universalienprojekt"  (1976)  I  mention  two 
complementary  procedures  for  discovering  language uni  versals: 
1.  The  investigaticn of  the  di~ensions and principles whose  existence 
is necessitated by  the  communieative  funotion  of language;  2.  The 
development  of a  formal  language  in which all syntactic rules are 
explicitly formulated  and  in which all syntactic categories are 
defined by their relation to a  minimally necessary number  of 
syntaetie categeries.  Sinee  the first proeedure is treated in many 
ef  t  q  other  papers  of this velume,  I  wish  to  diseuss the role of 
formal  methods  in the  research of language  uni  versals.  As  an  example 
I  wane  to  take  the  dimensions  of determination and  show  how  expressions 
denoting  cencePE  ara modified and  turned  into referende identifying 
expressions.  There  is a  general end a  specific motivation for  the 
introduetion of  formal  methods  into linguisties. The  general 
motivation is to  make  statements in linguisties 6S  exaet  and veri-
fiable as  they are in the natural seiences.  The  speeific 
motivation is to  make  the  grammars  of various languages  comparable 
by  deseribing  them  with the  same  form  of rules.  The  form  has to be 
flexible  enough  to describe  the  phenomfpa  of any possible natural 
language.  All natural languages  have  in common  that they may 
potentially express  any meaning.  The  flexibility of the  form  of 
grammatical rules may  therefore  be  attained,  if syntaetie rules 
are not  isolated from  the  semantic funetion  they express  and 
syntactic classes are not  defined merely by  the relative position 
of  th~ir elements in the  sentence,  but also by the  communicative 
function  tht1~ elements fulfil in their eombination with  eleffi~s 
of ~  classes. 
Montague  (1974)  has  shown  that this flexibility may  be attained 
by using  the  language  of algebra  combined with eategorial grammar. 
Algebraic  systems  have  been  developed  by  mathematicians to model 
any  systems  whose  operations are definable.  Montague  does  not merely 
use  the  tools of mathematics  for  describing  the  features  of 
language,  but regards  syntax,  semantics and pragmatics as branches 
of  m~thematics. One  cf the advantages of this approach is that 
-"e  m  -:1  apply  the laws  developed  by  mathematicians to  the  systems 
"'3tructed by linguists for  the  description and  explanation of 
n . ·ural language. 
---~---..... _-------, Montague  developed  two  kinds of formal languages.  1. A disambiguated 
natural language  that  specif1es the lexicon,  syntyctie  elasses and 
syntactie rules of a  natural language,  so that it may  be  unambiguously 
interpreted.  2.  A language  of  intensional logic,  an  extended Predieate 
Caleulus,  whieh  specifies the  semantics  of natural language  in such a  way, 
<  that  for  each  expression  we  may  express its extension and its intension. 
Intension is not  an  obscure abstract entity: it is defined as a  functlon 
from  possible worlds  into extensions. That  means,  if we  define a  possible 
world as an  ordered pair  of temporal and spatial coordinates,  the ex-
tension of a  declarative sentenoe (its truth-value)  depends  on  the 
time  and place of its utterance. A proposition (the intension of a 
declarative sentence)  is a  function that assigns a  truth-value to each 
possible world.  A function  may  be  represented as a  set of ordered 
pairs.  A proposition would  then  be  the set of pairs whose  first  com-
ponent  is a  possible world and whose  second .component  is the truth-
value for  the respective proposition in that possible world.  From  this 
we  may  ccnclude  that  two  senten  ces express the  same  proposition if 
they have  the  same  truth-value in a1l possible worlds.  This  corresponds 
to our  intuitive concept  of proposition.  Similarly the  extension of 
a  common  noun  (CN),  the size of  the set of elements to which it 
applies,  depends  on  the  time  and place of 1ts use.  A propertYt  the 
intension of  a  CN,  1s a  function that assigns to each possible world 
the set of individuals to which  this CN  refers. 
Montague's  syntax of a  disambiguated natural language is based on  an 
~lgebraic system.  An  algebraie  system is an ordered pair  (A,F),  where 
A  is an arbitrary set and F  is a  family  of operations.  (A  family is 
a  set whose  elements are indexed.)  In our  ease A is a  set of expressions, 
namely  the  expressions  of  the language. F  1s a  set of structural 
operation as  an  (n.1)- operationsiiMontagUe  defines an n-place  roe..u.  ...... 
plaoe ". ;9aU. For  instance addition  may  be  represented as  a  two-plaoe 
'!/"  e. Nt.A~..  ('  t.-l.I.. .. h,. 
~ng~  (PLUS  (t,4)=7)  or as a  three-place cteratjg. «3,4,7.)lPLUS) • 
.... '  A ~place operation is therefore a  specifie n-place relation,  . 
th  namely a  set  of n-tuples whose  n  oomponent  is uniquely determined 
by the  preceding n-1  components.  A structural operation may  be a  simple 
ooncl'.tenation  or  a  transformation.  Apart  from  the algebra10 system. 
Montae",-;' s  syntax specifies a  set of basic expressions and a  set of 
synte.,,·;io rules.  The  set of basic expressions may  be  oalled the 
lexicon of the language.  It consists of these express  ions that are not 





to at least  one  syntaetio olass. A syntaetic rule has  taee  eomponents. 
The  first  component  specifies the  operation used by  the rule,  the 
second  component  specifies the  syntactic category or categories of the 
expression or  expressions  operated upon  (the  operand  or operands), 
and  the  third oomponent  specifies the  category of the resulting ex-
pression. 
Montague  has  three rules  for  forming a  NP  from  a  CN  (oommon  Noun-
phrase): 
(Fo'  CN,  NP) 
(F1,  CN,  NP> 
(F2 ,  CN,  NP> 
where  Fo  1s the  operation that  ooncatenates ever: with the operand, 
F1  conoatenates ~  with  the  operand and F2conoatenates ~ or ~  with 
the  operand.  If DET  were  the  oategory of basic  expressions for 
artioles and  quantifiers,  one  syntactio rule would  be  suffioient  CF 
being the  operation of  ooncatenation):<F,(bET,C~. NP)  •  We  shall 
return to this problem later. 
Before  we  go  into the  details of  how  the syntactic rules function, 
we  have  to describe how  the syntaotic classes are established.  The 
aim  of  syntax is not  merely  to  dearibe  the  structure of a  language, 
but  also to explain its function.  The  syntactic classes have  to be 
set up  in  suoh  a  way  that their interrelation will express  the 
functional  properties of  the  language.  Since the various natural 
languages  have  a  diHerent  number  (and different kinds)  of syntactic 
classes,  we  have  to find  the  minimal number  of olasses  oommon  to all 
languages as  weIl as  a  universal means  to relate those classes to the 
other  cläSSBS  of  the  language.  Montague's basic idea is that eaoh 
syntactio'·olass has  a  oorresponding semantic type  in t'he  language  of 
intensional logio and  that relations between syntaotio olasses must 
oorrespond to the relations between the semantic types.  He  therefore 
starts his definition of sytaotic categories with two  category 
symbols  that  have  semantic relevance,  namely ~ for entity or indi-
vidual  expressions and i  for  thruth-value or deolarative sentence  (DS). 
(Individual expressions denote  entities and  DS  denote  truth-values.) 
It should  be  pointed out  that his oategories are not sets of express  ions 
but  serve as  indices of  such sets (not  to be  oonfused with the nuesrioal 
in:lioes of syntaotio operations).In order to make  the text lIIore 
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readable I  shalhe glect this difference between  ca  tegories and sets. 
Bince  I  am  not  defining sets of basic expressions (a lexicon),  no 
The 
misunderstanding  can arise.  other syntactic categories (apart  from 
~  and 1)  are  defined recursively with the aid of categorial grammar. 
The  recursive rule is that wheneVer  A and Bare categories A/B  and 
A//B are categories.  (The  different number  of slashes distinguishes 
different syntactic categories that have  the  same  semantic  function.) 
An  expression of the  category A,/B  or A//B is slich that when it is 
combined with an  expression of  the  category B,  an  expression of the 
category  Pt.  is producedj  e.g.  IV,  the  oategory of intransitive verb 
phrases,  is by  eategorial definition t/e (an expression such thst 
when  it is combined with an  entity expression it denotes a  truth-
value  !  NP,  the  eategory of  noun  phrases  (Montague  uses !  for  terms), 
is t/IV  (an expression such that when  it is combined with an intransi-
tive  verb  phrase  a  declarative  sentenee~S) is produeed).  The  order 
of,the  combination is not  stated in the  definition,  but will be  stated 
by  syntactie rules speeifie to  each language.  The  semante  types of the 
language  of intensional logie are  defined in such a  way  that the 
semantic rules will build up  translations of wholes  from  translations 
of the1r parts.  (Semantic-tJPes,  similar to syntactic categor1es, are 
indices ofelasses of express  ions of the language  of intensional 
logie.) For  example,  if we  eeneatenate  two  expressions  of  eategorlss 
A and B to an  expression of eategory C (in this ease A=C/B  or B=C/A) 
and !  1s the  name  of our function  from  syntactie categories into se-
mantie  types,  the  concatenation of expressions  of type  f(A)  and  f{B) 
will produce an  expression of type f(C).  Tha  symbols  tor the basic 
-
semantic  types  are also 1  and ~t  80  that  t(a)=e and t(t)=t. Thera  is 
a  third basic  symbol ~ (sense)  which  enables us  to define those types 
that are  inices of sets of expressions for  intension5.  The  reeursive 
rule  for  the definition of types  therefore  contains  two  parts: 
1.  W'henever  a,bE TYPE  (is an  element  of the set of types), (a,1:)4!iTYPE. 
2.  W'henever  aETYPE,  <sla,)~TYPE. The  expressions ot type (a,b) are 
functions  whose  arguments are  of type ~  and whose  values are of  type 
~. The  letter ~ represents  the  set of possible worlds,  so that ex-
pressions of the  type  <s,~are intensions of expressions of the 
type  ~. The  semantie  types are explained by their oorrespondence to 
syntactic categories:  The  semantic eorrespondenee  of a  category A/B 
(or A//B)  is a  funetion  of  the  intension of f(B)  1nto the  extension 
cf  f(A).  This 1s expressed by the  formula  f(A/B)=f(A//B)= ~s,f(B~ t 
f(A»  whenever  A,B  are syntaet1e categor1es •  For instanee a  CN, 
!. just like an  IV,  eombined  with an entity expression denotes a  truth: 
value  and is therefore of  category t//e. IV  belongs to the  syntactie 
eategory t/e.  The  different number  of slashes with the  same  category 
symbols  on  eaeh side of the  slashes  shows  that CN  and  IV  play different 
syntaetic roles but  have  the same  semantie funetion.  This is plausible 
when  we  remember  that in predicate logie verbs and nouns are expressed 
by  the  same  kind of predicatesymbols. Sinee  the language  of intensional 
logie is based  on  Predicate Calculus there is a  elass of expressions 
(predicates)  that  combine  with  express10ns of type  ~ (individual eon-
stants)  to  denote  truth-values.  The  aim  of using categorial grammar 
for  the  definition of syntactic elasses in natural language  is to 
rnake  them  unarnbiguously  interpretable into types of intensionallogte. 
A CN  is an  expression whose  referenee  has not  been speeified and 1s 
therefore  not  used direetly to  form  deelarative sentences in English. 
Our  eategories have  to  be  universal,  and a  natural language is 
imaginable  that  combines  expressions of eategory t/e with entity ex. 
pressions to  form  deelarative sentences.  The  semantie  type  eorresponding 
to t/e er  t//e i5 (~,e>, t> t  i.e. a  funetion  from  the  intension of 
entities (concepts)  to~'extension of  DS  (truth-valu~. The  truth or 
falsity of the  combination of a  predicate with an entity expression 
will dependon whether  the  entity refened to has  the  property ex-
pressed by  CN  in a  possible  world or not. 
Another  example  that is more  relevant to our discussion of eoncept 
formation is the  combination of adjectives with CN.  An  adjective 
(CN/CN)  is a  function  from  the  intension of a  CN  not  into the  eX-
tension  of  a  CN,  but  into the intension of a  CN.  This appears to be 
in contradiction to Montague's  translation rUle,  but it may  be 
justified. because  of the  reeursivity of the category CN/CN. 
Montague  (1974  e)  doesn't  treat the adjective. However,  in Montague 
(1974  a)  he  states:"the denotation of an adjectiv phrase is always a 
function  from  properties to properties". In the  phrase red horse, 
red isa function  that assigns to the  intension of horse  the intension 
or red horse.  This clearly shows  how  we  narrow the  extension of a  con-
cept  by modifying it. 
Coneept  modification is not  a  funetion that takes two  concepts ae 
arguments  and  a  new  concept as its value. but rather a  function with 
one  argument,  where  the  modifying  concept is the function and the modi-
fied  conapt its argument.  In order to fix the referenca of a  concept pt 
•  7 
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we  'sha11  need a  funotion  that will not modify a  oonoept  but  one  whose 
va1ue  will be  the referent  (or referents)  of the oonoept.  We  shal1 
oa11  the  syntaotio oategory of thes, funotions  DET,  defined as NP/ON, 
i.e. they  oombine  with a  CN  to form  an NP.  If !  is the name  cl  our 
function  from  syntaotio  categories into semantic  types,  the  semantio 
type  oorresponding to DET  ie «s,f(CN)  <f(NP~>  t  i.e. a  funotion 
from  the  intension of  CN  to the extension of NP,  whioh is exaot1y 
7 J  'ZifTrry 
what  we  mean  by  referenoe specifioation.  (The  formulation of the  type 
f(CN)  was  given above. NP  is defined as t/IV.  i .. e.  a  NP  oombines  with 
an  IV  to form  a  DS.  The  semantic  type  of NP  is4:s.«s,), »;) t 
i.e. a  function  that takes  the  intension of  an  IV  1nto a  truth-va1ueJ 
Apart  from  the  type  corresponding to the  NP,  whlch  represents its func-
tion in a  sentence,  Montague  has a  basic tranäation ru1e  whioh  trans-
lates NPs  into sets of properties of  individual oonoepts. These are in 
one-to-one  oorrespondenoe  with the individua1s that the  NP  refers to. 
The  translation rule has  three parts,  the  translation being different 
aooording  to whether  the  determiner is every, ~,  or~. Bince proper 
names  in Eng1ish are also NPs,  Montague  also trans1ates them as sets 
of properties. This  enab1es  him  to treat NPs  semantioa11y in a  unified 
way,  irrespeotiveoS'whethr  they contain quantifiers,  articles or 
proper  names. 
I  do  not  wish to go  further  into the teohniques of Montague  Grammar. 
I  just wanted  to  show  that  there 1s a  universal way  of defining syn-
taotio categories for any natural 1anguage and that these oategories 
in addition have  semantic relevanoe. 
There are further  components  of the noun  phrase that i11ustrate the 
efficienor of Montague  Grammar  in exp1aining  the various funotions 
of  determination.  The  distinotion between restrictive and non-
restriotive relative clauses is a  good  exam,le for  showing  the dlfferenoe 
between äodifloation and  eharacterlzation.  By  modifieation,  a  given 
coneept  i8 further  determinedj  by  eharaeterlzation,  a  feature already 
eontained in the  eoncept  i8 repeated..  Therefore  we  aan  on1y 
eharacterize a  p~er noun  and  ne  ver modify it, sinee it expresses the 
set of all the properties of an  individual and therefore anything 
stated about  this individual is ~eady oontained in the meaning  of the 
proper noun. This  means,on  the  other 
not  be  eombined with an 
with a  CN.,  This  may  not 
hand,  that a  restrietive relative elause may  , 
NP  whose  teferenee has  been fixed,  but only 
be  quite elear at first sight. Let us take as 
an  example  the  following  eonversation: 
A.  Why  didn't you  bring the  book? 
B.  Which  book? 
A.  The  book  I  gave  you  yesterday. 
The  relative elause 1  ~ave you  yesterday appears  to be attaehed to the  NP 
~~.  This is not  so.  The  artiele is used to express identifi-
cation of a  referent.  1.e. to  show  that an  element is a  speeific 
member  of  a  set whose  properties are given by  the  CN  to whieh it is 
attached. In the first sentence A thought  that he  had identified the 
referent  (for B).  By  B'S  reaction he  found  out  that this was  not  the 
case,  so  he  had to  form  a  new  eonoept,  namely ~  1 gave you yester-
day and attach the definite artiele in order to show  that the referent 
had been'identified. 
The  syntaeticrule for  combining restrietive clauses with CN  would 
be  'If x  is a  CN  and y  isa DS.  then F(x,y)  is a  CN',  where .! and 1. 
are metalinguistic variables and F  1s the  two-place  operation of 
concatenation or,  more  :lirmally, (F(ClN,DS).  CN)  •  This rule would 
obviously have  to be  more  speeifie, if our relative clause eontained 
a  relative pronoun. 
The  oorresponding rule for  non-restrict~ve clauses would be  'Ir x  is  ..... U,.. 
a  NP  and  y  is a  DS,  then F(IXI,  'y',  ',I~  This  time F  is a  four-
place operation adding a  eomma  before and after the relative elausB. 
(In oase  the relative clause  stands at the  end  of a  sentence,  the 
second  comma  may  be  deleted by  one  of the rules used in generating 
the  amblgous  natural language  from  the  disambiguated language.) 
Thus  the  two  NPs  !h!1.  president, .'!!h2.  writes poetry (ther'e is only one 
president) and!h! president .'!!h2.  writes poetry (in distinetion to 
the presidents who  don't write  poetry) are  combined  by different 
rules. It is irrelevant whether we  deal with the definite or the 
indefinite article (e.g. ~~,  .'!!h2.  knows  everything about !22a.>. 
A NP  determined  by  everwmay notbe characterized by  a  non-restrietive 
clause.  The  reason is probably the distributive cbaracter of every. 
Plural nouns  ereate a  special problem,  for they may  ba  modified or 
$" I  T  xn 
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oharaoterized,  even in their indefinite form.  Thus  the  phrase  dogs 
~~  furious  denotes  the  oombination  of  doghood  and furiousness, 
while  dogs, ~~  furious,  adds nothing to the properties of dogs, 
sinoe  the non-restriotive relative olause  presupposes thatäLl dogs 
are furious.  We  shall discuss this problem later. when  we.deal with 
numerals. 
There is no  syntactio class  to whioh relative clauses belong,  sinoe 
we  introduoed  them  by  syntactio rules.  Montague  uses similar rules, 
though  they are  more  detailed by  specifying pronouns.  I  think this 
is unsatisfactorYt  since it obscures the fact  that relative  olauses 
have  a  funotion  similar to that  of adjectiveso  Thomason  (1976) 
accounts  for  the  similarity between relative clauses and adjeotives 
by  extending the  number  of syntactic categories.  He  uses  operators 
on  sentenoes  containing pronouns  to form  abstraots whioh  again are 
op'erated upon relativizers to  form  relative clauses,  which are ele-
ments  of  the  category  of adjeotive phrases.  This is a  very plausible 
extension of Montague  Grammar  that  increases its flexibility.  The 
relativizers are of  category ACN/AB.  ACN  = CN/CN  are adjective 
phrases,  while  AB  =  t/e is the  category of abstracts.  The  abstracts 
play a  role similar to  the lambda-express  ions  in high  er order logic. 
They are expressions for  properties and 
of entities to form  DS.  ThusA. x  (I gave 
may 
you 
be  combined with names 
x  yesterday)  would be 
the  expression 
Applied to  the 
for  the  property  tthing  I  gave  you  yesterdayt. 
name  of an  entity it will result in a  true or false 
sentence,  depending  on  whether  or not  I  gave  you  that thing yesterday. 
For  the  expressions  corrsponding to the  lambda-operator in logic, 
Thomason  defines  the  category  of operators AB/t ={ thato'  that1, 
... J  that  combine  with a  DS  containing pronouns  to  form  an abstract 
(lambda-expression).  The  index indioates which  of the  indexed pro-
nouns  (variables)  in the  sentence is to be  bound  by the  operator. 
If we  have  a  sentence  like ~  gave i!~  ~  yesterday,  we  have 
to use  a  different  operator aocording to whether  we  want  to form  the 
relative clause ~  gaye i! to ~  yesterday,  whieh.!!!. gave  you 
yesterday,  .2!. ~  .!!!.  gaye i! yesterday.  The  category of rl3.sU_yizers 
ACN/AB  = {SUCht  WhO}  oombine  with abstracts to  form  adjective 
phrases.  Thomason  has  an  e:ld itional syntaotic rule that states 
that adjectives of more  than  one  word  follow the  CN  while  those  of 
one  word  preoede it. Rodman  (1976)  has  introduoed syntaotio rules 
Y' ,.-zv  .. 
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@in tU? 
that ereate relative elauses in English without using the unnatural 
such.  -
Thomason  also introduces  the  category DET  =  T/CN  (T  for  termphrase = 
NP)  instead of  introducing the reference determiners by  syntactic 
rules,  as MOFtague  does.  This  has the advantage  that it yields a  list 
of all expressions used forreference  determination and at the  same 
mm 
time  decreases the  number  of syntactic rules. By  refaanee  determina-
tion we  mean  that  a  concept  expression is turned into a  referenee 
expression irrespective of whether  the reference is definite or 
indefinite.  The  indefinite article,  even  in its non-specific sense, 
signifies reference determination.  If Mary  wants to marry a  millionaire,\ 
sh. wants  to marry a  man  possessing a  million dollars and not  a  con-
cept.  In other words,  reference determination is the transitionßrom 
competenQe  to performance.  A sentence may  be  well-formed according 
to the rltles  of the language,  but if it isto malte  sense in a  con-
versatio~ it has  to  determine  a  reference. 
We  have  already mentioned  the  problem of plural nouns.  At  first sight 
it would  seem  th~they may  either determine a  referenee,  or  be  further 
modified be fore  thtiY  are  used for referring.  However.  this is a 
wron g impression,  for plural nouns  represent sets and  not concepts. 
Since,  as  we  have  pointed out,  only concepts are  modified,  plurali-
zation must  take  place after modification. Bartsch (1973)  gives an 
exeellent analysis of the  function  of number  and numbers.  She  defines 
a  plural operator !1 that  maps  the  intension of an individual eon-
eept  onto the power  set of its extension exeluding the  empty set. 
(The  power  set of a  set A is the set of all the  subsets of A.)  This 
means  that the  plural operator would  be  of eategory NPL/CN,  the re-
sulting expression being  of  eategory NPL  (Noun  Plural).  The  resluting 
semantie  type is a  predieate over sets,  sinee number  is not  a 
property of an entity but  of a  set of entities. Bartseh then in-
troduees a  eategory  NUM  =  NPL/NPL  mapping  intensions of predieates 
over sets of individual eoneepts into predieates  over sets of indi-
vidual coneepts.  NPLs  are  transformed into Plural NPs  with the he1p 
of  the  operators  'some',  'all' or  'the'.  'some'  and 'all' being optio-
nal. 
A1though  I  think this is a  good  demonstration of how  to incorporate - 10  ..I 
number  into a  Montague  Grammar,  I  don't  quite see the point  of 
having  a  recursive  category NPL/NPL.  It is on1y  used  on  expressions 
produced  by  the  operator 11.  I  wou1d  propose  to ine1ude  the numerals 
in the  category NPL/CN,  mapping  the intension of a  CN  into the 
power  set of its extension.  In this ease  we  need not  exc1ude  the  empty 
set,  keeping it as  the  va1ue  of the  numera1  zero,  1inguist1cal1y 
expressed as ho.  Apart  from  the 10g16a1 argument,  there is a 
1inguistic argument  against  the  operation 11 taking place before the 
operation of  numera1s:  there are many  languages that don't  use 
plural nouns  with numbers,  e.g.  in Chinese  or Turkish  'one man'  and 
'three men'  are  ige ren or bir adam  and  sange ren or üc  adam  re-
spectively. For  these  languages  we  need  an  extra rule deleting the 
plural forms.  Since  the  numerals a1ready express plurality, it is more 
plausible  to add  syntactic rules for those  languages  that redundant1y 
pluralize their nouns. 
Sinoe all NPLs  may  be  combined with intransitive verbs to form  DS,  I 
would like to define  them  as tl/IV,  giving  them  the  same  semantio 
status as NPs  but  a  different syntactic status.  NLPs  may  be  preoeded 
by definite determiners  to form  a  termphrase.  I  would  therefore like 
to renameNPL  aS  INP  (indefinite noun  phrase).  This  would  force  us to 
exclude  'no'  from  NUM,  because it cannot  be  preoeded  by adefinite de-
terminer.  If,  however,  we  remember  the  exoeptional status of zero in 
mathematics,  we  may  keep it as a  numerale  Having  one  exception makes  us  n 
think of others.  Wh~ about  the  indefinite srticle?  INPs  are 
distinguished from  NPs  by  their indefiniteness.  In a  texta noun  is 
generally preceded by  the  indefinite article when  it is first mentioned 
and  by  the definite article when  it is mentioned again.  This makes it 
feasible  to have  a  syntactic rule that d.letes an indefinite article 
when  the definite article ia oombined with an  INP  that starts with an 
indefinite article. The  function  of the  other quantifiers is also 
wor'th  investigating.  We  cannot  have  a  disambiguated language  where 
both  'sorne'  and 'all' are  optio~~l. This would  make  the plural 
form  ambiguous.  We  have  to decide for  one  of the  two  or state 
conditions for  their optionality (e.g.  'sl~ is optionsl in subject 
position snd  'sorne'  in object positions).  The  best  idea is to in-
clude  the  optionality in the transfer rules from  the  disambiguated 
language to the  natural language.  Thi, keeps  the syntactic rules 
of the  disambiguated language  simpler aad  shows - 11  -
where  the natural language  be  comes  ambiguous. 
The  separate  class  INP  1s  just1f1ed by  tbe fact tbat  on  tbe  dimension 
of  determination tbere 1s no  immediate  jump  from  concept  formation 
to reference specification. fince  tbere 1s tbe  intermediate step of 
determining  tbe  s1ze  of tbe set to wbicb tbe  concept is to be  applied. 
I  have  tried to  sbow  tbat Montague  has  succeeded in making  tbe  tools 
of algebra useful for  the  treatment  of natural language.  Tbe  intro-
duetion of categorial grammar  into tbe algebra makes  the letter still 
more  powerful in tbe  construetion of a  syntax for natural languages. 
The  universality of tbe  category definitions makes  different 
languages  comparable  and  since  tbe  two  basic categories are defined 
by tbeir relation to  semantic  typeSt  a  semantic type  may  be~mbiguous­
l~ assigned to  every syntactic  category. 
.i - 12 -
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